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TOWARDS A TRANSNATIONAL CRITICAL RACE THEORY IN
EDUCATION: PROPOSING CRITICAL RACE THIRD WORLD
APPROACHES TO EDUCATION POLICY
STEVEN L. NELSON*
ABSTRACT
Scholars have applied Critical Race Theory in both domestic
and international contexts; however, a theory on the transnational
role of race and racism in education policy has not emerged. In this
Article, I borrow from the tenets of Critical Race Theory (CRT) and
Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) to formulate
Critical Race Third World Approaches to Education Policy (TWAEP-
Crit). In constructing this theory, I argue that Black Americans are
in practice and lived experience treated as third world citizens, even
as they reside in the United States. I prove the third world status
of Black peoples in the United States by employing an analysis of the
United States’ response to the International Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Thus, Black Americans
and those who advocate on behalf of and in pursuit of educational
equity for Black Americans may benefit greatly from the infusion of
the third world approaches to international law. Likewise, Black peo-
ples in other parts of the world and those who advocate for human
rights and justice for Black peoples, particularly those in the Global
South, stand to gain equally as much from the study of strategies of
Black peoples in the United States.
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II. THIRD WORLD APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW (TWAIL)
A. The Core of TWAIL
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Maintenance of Domination
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III. THE UNITED STATES’ REJECTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE MARGINALIZATION OF BLACK
AMERICANS
A. Rejection of International Human Rights Treaties and
Racial Oppression in the United States
B. Refusal and Race: The United States’ International Policy
and Domestic Racism
C. Intersection of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and
Racially Inequitable Educational Outcomes
D. Part I, Article 1 of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and
the United States
E. Part I, Article 5 of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and
the United States
F. Part I, Articles 2, 4, and 7 of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination and the United States
IV. CONSIDERING CRITICAL RACE PERSPECTIVES ON THE UNITED
STATES’ FAILURE TO FULLY ADOPT INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATIES
V. APPLYING CRITICAL RACE THIRD WORLD APPROACHES TO
EDUCATION POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
IN THE STEAD OF A CONCLUSION: A CALL TO RESEARCH
INTRODUCTION
Critical Race Theory (CRT) has been used in both domestic and
international contexts.1 There is, however, a paucity of research that
considers CRT in a transnational context. In this conceptual Article,
I argue that there is a need for a Transnational Critical Race Theory
approach. Moreover, I argue that the legal field, which introduced the
scholarly theorization of Critical Race Theory, has conceptualized a
theory that may provide a suitable lens for a Transnational Critical
1. See, e.g., David Gillborn, Education Policy as an Act of White Supremacy: Whiteness,
Critical Race Theory and Education Reform, 20 J. EDUC. POL’Y 485, 485 (2005); David
Gillborn, Full of Sound and Fury, Signifying Nothing? A Reply to Dave Hill’s Race and
Class in Britain: A Critique of the Statistical Basis for Critical Race Theory in Britain,
8 J. CRITICAL EDUC. POL’Y STUD. 79, 79 (2010) (in the international context); Gerardo R.
Lopez, The (Race Neutral) Politics of Education: A Critical Race Theory Perspective, 39
EDUC. ADMIN. Q. 68, 72 (2003); Janet J. Smith & David O. Stovall, ‘Coming Home’ to New
Homes and New Schools: Critical Race Theory and the New Politics of Containment, 23
J. EDUC. POL’Y 135, 135 (2008) (in the domestic context).
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Race Theory. This theory, Third World Approaches to International
Law (TWAIL), is an international version of CRT. I argue that a com-
bination of components and perspectives from CRT and TWAIL
produces a formidable framework by which critical scholars seeking
a Transnational Critical Race Theory may 1) research the origins and
impacts of law and law-like systems on peoples subjected to Third
World treatment, 2) analyze data collected in research on how law and
law-like systems impact peoples subjected to Third World treatment,
and 3) construct research that centers the stories of resistance, coping,
and imaginations of peoples who are subject to Third World treatment.
I start my endeavor by first discussing Critical Race Theory and
the impact of Critical Race Theory on educational scholarship. Next,
I introduce the scholarly approach that international law scholars
refer to as TWAIL. I spend considerably more time on TWAIL than
on CRT given TWAIL’s novelty to educational discourse. I then pro-
pose, as succinctly as possible, my articulation of Critical Race Third
World Approaches to Education Policy (TWAEP-Crit). Following this
articulation, I present evidence of how Black Americans in the United
States are similarly situated to other peoples subjected to Third
World treatment. I then apply TWAEP-Crit to the United States’ re-
fusal to join and enforce international human rights treaties. Finally,
I close out the Article with a call to action in the place of a conclu-
sion. This call to action is merely a call to commence the use of this
scholarly approach, but I suspect that scholars who endeavor to use
this scholarly approach will have additions, alterations, and deletions
that I welcome.
I. CRITICAL RACE THEORY IN EDUCATION (CRT)
CRT is a framework for understanding how law and policy nega-
tively impact peoples of color; moreover, CRT is race scholars’ an-
swer to Critical Legal Studies, a class-based critical analysis that fails
to critique the role that law plays in subjugating Black and Brown
peoples.2 Although Derrick Bell,3 a forefather of CRT, employed the
framework in the context of education law, Gloria Ladson-Billings
and William Tate IV are given credit for introducing CRT to educa-
tion research in the context of curriculum and instruction.4 CRT is
2. RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION
2–3 (N.Y.U. Press 2001).
3. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 470 (1976); see also Derrick
A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 518, 518 (1980) [hereinafter Bell, Interest Convergence Dilemma].
4. See Gloria Ladson-Billings, Just What is Critical Race Theory and What’s It
Doing in a Nice Field Like Education?, 11 QUALITATIVE STUD. EDUC. 7 (1998) [hereinafter
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more of an approach rather than a methodology or a theory. Thus,
there is no dispute-free set of tenets for CRT or CRT in Education.
For example, Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic articulate that the
following themes are most typically found in CRT scholarship: 1) that
racism is an indispensable and ever-present factor in society in the
United States, 2) that racialized populations in the United States re-
ceive only symbolic gains in law and policy and that those symbolic
gains are tied to a net benefit for white Americans, 3) that race is
socially constructed to aid and abet the oppression of targeted groups,
4) that efforts to essentialize the experiences and identities of racial-
ized peoples must be resisted and replaced with understandings of the
intersectionality of oppressed peoples’ identities, and 5) that margin-
alized peoples’ voices and stories have been excluded from main-
stream understandings of knowledge and sources of knowledge.5 On
the other hand, Maria J. Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence III, Richard
Delgado, and Kimberle Williams Crenshaw suggest six—rather than
five—common themes in CRT scholarship: 1) the recognition that rac-
ism is endemic to society and that race and racism are permanent
fixtures in the United States, 2) a critique of narratives that argue for
objectivity, merit, neutrality, and colorblindness, 3) the confronting
of ahistoricism and the intentional effort to provide non-dominant
narratives as contextualization for contemporary experiences, 4) the
acknowledgment of the depth, worth, and independent validity of the
experiences and knowledge of peoples subjected to racialized oppres-
sion, 5) the explicit acknowledgment that research that considers race
is inherent disciplinary, and 6) an effort to work towards identifying,
naming, and combating racial and racialized oppression.6
When applied to educational research, CRT affords scholars the
ability to critically examine the historical and societal impacts of edu-
cation policies and practices, and to identify, name, and address the
inequities arising from historical and contemporary education laws,
policies, and practices. CRT is an inter-, multi-, and transdisciplinary
approach—that includes law, sociology, history, etc.—to address the
role of race and racism in education law, policy, and practice.7 Gloria
Ladson-Billings, What is Critical Race Theory]; Gloria Ladson-Billings, The Evolving
Role of Critical Race Theory in Educational Scholarship, 8 RACE, ETHNICITY & EDUC. 115
(2005); Gloria Ladson-Billings, Critical Race Theory—What it is Not, in HANDBOOK OF
CRITICAL RACE THEORY IN EDUCATION, 34, 34 (Marvin Lynn & Adrienne D. Dixson eds.,
2006); see also William F. Tate IV, Critical Race Theory and Education: History, Theory,
and Implications, 22 REV. RES. IN EDUC. 195, 195 (1997).
5. DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 2, at 5–9.
6. ADRIENNE DIXSON & CELIA ROUSSEAU, CRITICAL RACE THEORY IN EDUCATION: ALL
GOD’S CHILDREN GOT A SONG 33 (2005) (citing MARIA J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT
WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 6
(1993)).
7. See Daniel G. Solórzano & Armida Ornelas, A Critical Race Analysis of Latina/o
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Ladson-Billings further emphasizes the inherent connection between
scholarship in education and law through the use of restorying within
the works of Derrick Bell.8 She also asserts the connection between
law and education by highlighting how legislative processes inform
restrictions and policies on the social construction of education.9 Edu-
cation policy scholars who employ CRT, in the stead of other critical
theories, are able to more effectively, 1) work to ground their works
in the important context of race and racism, 2) push back against
traditional notions of education and educational research, 3) center
their research in the lived experiences of Black students, families, and
communities, 4) produce research that serves to liberate oppressed
peoples, and 5) use interdisciplinary perspectives to understand the
multiple manifestations of racial oppression.10 However, even the
use of CRT appears limited because it focuses only on individual,
domestic understandings of race and racism and fails to adequately
consider transnational understandings, impacts, and similarities of
race and racial oppression.11 For this reason, I seek to advance a more
robust, transnational CRT.
II. THIRD WORLD APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW (TWAIL)
TWAIL scholarship suggests that international law supports and
sustains the oppression of peoples subjected to Third World treat-
ment.12 There is broad diversity in TWAIL, yet there are general,
prevailing themes that solidify this intellectual traditional, a set of
worldviews that unify scholars within the field.13 To this end, TWAIL
is more of a scholarly approach than either a methodology or theory.14
According to TWAIL scholars, international law legitimizes hege-
monic structures that ensure domination by First World nations.15
and African American Advanced Placement Enrollment in Public High Schools, 87 HIGH
SCH. J. 15, 15 (2004); see also Tara J. Yosso, Laurence Parker, Daniel Solórzano &
Marvin Lynn, From Jim Crow to Affirmative Action and Back Again: A Critical Race
Discussion of Radicalized Rationales and Access to Higher Education, 28 REV. RES. IN
EDUC. 1, 1–2 (2004).
8. Ladson-Billings, What is Critical Race Theory, supra note 4, at 7, 12–17, 21.
9. Id. at 17.
10. See Solórzano & Ornelas, supra note 7, at 17.
11. See Yosso, Parker, Solórzano & Lynn, supra note 7, at 3–4.
12. See, e.g., B. S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto,
8 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 3, 3 (2006) (suggesting that international law undermines the
stability and growth of countries considered to be Third World and the peoples who live
in those countries).
13. See Obiora Chinedu Okafor, Critical Third World Approaches to International Law
(TWAIL): Theory, Methodology or Both, 10 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 371, 377–78 (2008).
14. See id. (debating whether TWAIL is a theory, a methodology, or an approach and
ultimately considering whether TWAIL is a school of thought).
15. Chimni, supra note 12, at 15.
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A key focus area of TWAIL scholarship is linking current international
law to the colonial project that commenced at or around the sixteenth
century as the transatlantic slave trade.16 TWAIL scholars also view
contemporary international law as taking a deficit view of peoples
subjected to Third World treatment.17 Furthermore, TWAIL scholar-
ship critiques existing human rights paradigms as West-centric and
having little nuance to the idiosyncrasies of each individual context
of subjugation.18 The aim of TWAIL scholarship, as a theoretical
perspective, is to help scholars put into words, shed light upon, and
reify the contradictory and oppressive functions of international law
on peoples assigned to receive Third World treatment.19 TWAIL,
however, is not without its critics. TWAIL has been critiqued as being
only a critique of dominant ideologies without offering a theory of
resistance.20 I seek, in this Article, to fill this gap in the scholarly liter-
ature by combining TWAIL with CRT to put forth a scholarly ap-
proach that aids in the development of theories of resistance.
A. The Core of TWAIL
TWAIL scholars suggest that international law is circular in
reasoning, for it professes to prevent further victimization of peoples
subjected to Third World treatment while relying upon that very logic
to support a narrative that peoples subjected to Third World treat-
ment should receive further intervention from the First World.21 In
these interventions, the First World restructures Third World states
to resolve any potential further victimizations.22 However, according
to Makau Mutua, hegemonic powers often use a “carrot-and-stick”
approach to ensnarl peoples subjected to Third World treatment in
certain inescapable policy dilemmas.23 Furthermore, TWAIL scholars
argue that critical approaches must consider how the First World has
promoted and failed to prevent violence that international law now
seeks to redress.24 Not shockingly, the subject of many international
16. B. S. Chimni, The Past, Present, and Future of International Law: A Critical Third
World Approach, 8 MELB. J. INT’L L. 499, 501 (2007).
17. Antony Anghie & B. S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law
and Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflict, 2 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 77, 86 (2003).
18. Opeoluwa Adetoro Badaru, Examining the Utility of Third World Approaches to
International Law for International Human Rights Law, 10 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV.
379, 384 (2008).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 385–86.
21. Chimni, supra note 16, at 502.
22. Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights,
42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 201, 203, 238–39 (2001).
23. Id. at 239.
24. Anghie & Chimni, supra note 17, at 90.
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laws is not the atrocities that the European continent and its people
have unleashed on the rest of the world.25 Instead, international law
developed only after the Jewish Holocaust, a tragedy that impacted
European peoples.26 Still, the First World has carefully manicured
international law to avoid application of human rights to the ways
in which the First World has treated marginalized and racialized
peoples within their own borders.27 Because only First World powers
get to define stability and peace, the tragic paradox of being on the
receiving end of Third World treatment is that we are more likely
to suffer in times of purported peace than in times of war.28
It is perhaps this tragic paradox that centers one core compo-
nent of TWAIL. TWAIL scholars argue that the starting point for
analyzing the validity of international law, peace, or stability should
not be Eurocentrism.29 Instead, other cultures must be seen as capa-
ble of regulating themselves, with or without formalized law.30 To
this end, TWAIL scholarship, in general, views international law,
and to some extent, any law made without the input of marginalized
peoples, as illegitimate, predatory, and bound to oppress.31 Moreover,
the only legitimate evaluation of international law is in the context
of the lived experience of peoples subjected to Third World treatment.32
Critical TWAIL, the second generation of TWAIL scholarship, sug-
gests that international law, to be of any real liberatory import for
peoples subjected to Third World treatment, must be both transforma-
tive and emancipative.33 The use of a Critical TWAIL approach could
and should, then, lead to the unveiling and establishment of new—
although likely pre-existing—alternatives to current sites of knowl-
edge production in the area of international law and race relations.34
Ulimately, then, Critical TWAIL seeks to “globalize the sources of
critical knowledge and address the material . . . concerns of third
world peoples.”35
B. Defining Third World
There is an emerging transnational capitalist class, and these
separate, distinct components of the transnational elite class from
25. Id. at 88.
26. See Mutua, supra note 22, at 212.
27. Anghie & Chimni, supra note 17, at 90.
28. See Anghie & Chimni, supra note 17, at 92; Mutua, supra note 22, at 206.
29. Mutua, supra note 22, at 207.
30. Id.
31. See Badaru, supra note 18, at 379.
32. Anghie & Chimni, supra note 17, at 78.
33. Chimni, supra note 16, at 499–500.
34. Badaru, supra note 18, at 386.
35. Chimni, supra note 12, at 4.
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various First World nations are forming a unified international law
to promote their agenda.36 According to B. S. Chimni the question is
not whether there will be a global state, rather what remains elusive
is the identification of the nature and structure of the global state.37
The positionality of peoples subjected to Third World treatment via
the neoliberal capitalist project serves to bind and unite the Third
World.38 Still, some scholars often attempt to point to “numbers,
variations, and differences in the presence of structures and pro-
cesses” of oppression to suggest that there are no commonalities in
the ways that peoples subjected to Third World treatment are op-
pressed.39 However, these same scholars miss the fact that similar
systems of oppression will inherently have divergent manifestations
in different contexts and localities.40 Race also binds the Third World.
Race is and has been an indispensable factor in the defining, con-
structing, and othering of peoples subjected to Third World treatment
by way of the colonial project.41 Even in a post-colonial world, we have
yet to reach a time when decolonization has meant complete libera-
tion for peoples subjected to Third World treatment.42 The most
current version of the colonial project maintains its rejectionist stance
towards cross-cultural contamination, discouraging the mixing of
cultures and preferring the domination of Eurocentric ideals.43
I use the term “Third World” in the same capacity as Karin
Mickelson.44 She uses Third World to identify and name peoples who
are removed from power and singled out by hegemomic forces for
treatment as either savages or victims (or both).45 In addition to being
distanced from power and singled out for mistreatment, peoples
subjected to Third World treatment are also distanced from sover-
eignty and protection from systemic violence.46 In this sense, Third
World remains a useful term if only to shed light on the way that poli-
cies treat differently peoples in oppressed, colonized, and marginalized
places and spaces. Third World does not suggest a monolithic lived
36. Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Counter-Hegemonic International Law: Rethinking
Human Rights and Development as a Third World Strategy, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 767, 767
(2006); see also Chimni, supra note 16, at 503–04.
37. Chimni, supra note 16, at 510.
38. Javad Babajani Rooni, The Role of the Third World in International Law, 9 LIFE
SCI. J. 5035, 5035 (2012).
39. Id.
40. See Chimni, supra note 12, at 21.
41. Anghie & Chimni, supra note 17, at 85.
42. See Karin Mickelson, Rhetoric and Rage: Third World Voices in International
Legal Discourse, 16 WIS. INT’L L.J. 353, 404 (1998).
43. Mutua, supra note 22, at 205.
44. Mickelson, supra note 42, at 356–57.
45. Id. at 354–57.
46. See Chimni, supra note 16, at 500; Mickelson, supra note 42, at 363.
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experience for peoples subjected to Third World treatment. Yet, a
diverse and pluralistic set of experiences does not necessarily escape
the ability or need for aggregation of similar, even if not identical,
experiences.47 TWAIL scholars have noted the long lasting suffering
of peoples subjected to Third World treatment, those for whom
poverty and uncertainty are a daily ritual, as well as how peoples
subjected to Third World treatment are acutely aware of their and
others’ oppressive circumstances.48 I, therefore, name and identify
Black Americans as Third World citizens despite our living in the
United States because we experience the same removal from power,
lack of protection from abuse, and daily uncertainty that similar sit-
uated peoples in international contexts endure.49
C. Peoples Subjected to Third World Treatment and the
Maintenance of Domination
The globalization of economic and human rights policies dehu-
manizes those it purports to serve.50 These policies concentrate
power and sovereignty in the capitalist, democratic state, all but
assuring that peoples subjected to Third World treatment do not
have the power, position, or legitimacy to contest policies that serve
to subjugate us.51 For the most part, the neoliberal agenda has dis-
placed the need for violence as a form of maintaining domination.52
In fact, international law and policy have assured the subjugation
of peoples subjected to Third World treatment through the neoliberal
capitalist project.53 International law is organized in a way that
lures peoples subjected to Third World treatment through trickery.54
Indeed, the moment of empowerment through international law is
simultaneously the moment of utter subjugation for peoples sub-
jected to Third World treatment.55
Similarly, human rights activities on behalf of the Western
world have little, if any, history of anti-imperialism.56 Instead, much
of the mission of Western-based or Western-oriented human rights
47. Chimni, supra note 12, at 4–5.
48. See Anghie & Chimni, supra note 17, at 78; see also Mickelson, supra note 42, at
402.
49. See generally CHARLES V. HAMILTON & KWAME TURE, BLACK POWER: POLITICS OF
LIBERATION IN AMERICA xix (2011).
50. See Chimni, supra note 12, at 7–15.
51. See id.
52. Anghie & Chimni, supra note 17, at 89.
53. Id.
54. Chimni, supra note 16, at 501.
55. Id.
56. Rajagopal, supra note 36, at 770.
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organizations has been to legitimize European culture and prac-
tices.57 Existing international law creates a false dichotomy of good
versus evil, wherein good is European and bad is “other.”58 For in-
stance, there is evidence that international tribunals charged with
protecting human rights fail to investigate and actively dismiss the
need to consider the actions of First World countries.59 These tribu-
nals usually state, “that no inquiry [is] useful and that nothing would
emerge” from such investigations.60 Likewise, international nongov-
ernmental organizations fail to focus much, if any, attention on human
rights violations in the Western world.61 In the context of interna-
tional law, alleged preferences for participation and democracy are
quickly shunted in favor of power and subjugation.62 Relying on no-
tions of savagery, Western powers force political democracy on
peoples subjected to Third World treatment, suggesting that political
democracy is a silver bullet for the monstrous boogeymen savages
that haunt peoples subjected to Third World treatment.63 First World
nations appear to have no problem, on the other hand, intervening
into and subverting democratic elections to ensure that the issues of
First World nations remain paramount in the Third World despite
alleging unwavering support of the democratic state.64 The end result
of these tactics is even more offensive. Despite a discourse of inter-
national human rights that prioritizes the systemically disadvantaged,
First World nations continue to close their doors to refugees from
the very chaos that First World nations had a hand in creating.65
In the context of the human rights struggle, the First World has
practiced revisionist history.66 Peoples subjected to Third World treat-
ment are often viewed as savages and are presented as outrageously
cruel and unthinkably backwards, effectively dissolving their hu-
manity.67 On the other hand, some peoples subjected to Third World
treatment are viewed as victims, those whose humanity has been
compromised and violated by the savages.68 Not surprisingly, the
victim status is dynamic.69 An oppressive, hegemonic structure can
57. See Mutua, supra note 22, at 215.
58. Id. at 203, 221.
59. See Chimni, supra note 12, at 12–13.
60. Id. at 91.
61. Mutua, supra note 22, at 217.
62. Anghie & Chimni, supra note 17, at 94–95.
63. Mutua, supra note 22, at 205.
64. See Chimni, supra note 12, at 6; see also Chimni, supra note 16, at 503.
65. Chimni, supra note 16, at 507; see also Rajagopal, supra note 36, at 775.
66. See Mutua, supra note 22, at 225; Chimni, supra note 16, at 502.
67. Mutua, supra note 22, at 223–27.
68. Id. at 227–33.
69. Id.
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move peoples subjected to Third World treatment between savage
and victim (and back).70 Finally, peoples of European descent (West-
ern, civilized societies) are considered saviors.71 Saviors are those who
come to redeem the humanity of those subjected to Third World treat-
ment.72 In this usage, Western and civilized present as redundant
because the existing colonial project views only peoples of Western
societies as being capable of civilization.73 The savior, however, is not
particularly a human being.74 The savior is actually a set of colonial-
based norms and practices that are formed from abstractly liberal
thought.75 Contemporary international policy and law rejects, mini-
mizes, or ignores the contributions of pioneering human rights ac-
tivists from non-Western lineages.76 These terms have power in the
revisionist version of history because the First World tends to over-
look the historical and contemporary manifestations of resistance to
hegemony.77 In many cases, the non-European world had previously
established practices that were—after colonization—considered recog-
nized principles of international law.78 Still, TWAIL scholars also
consider that the colonial project has influenced, if not dictated, later
evolutions of international law.79 Given the First World’s ability to
legitimize narratives, it should not be a surprise that human rights
campaigns—especially those led by the Western world—shape the
prototypical savage as non-European, although some of the most
savage human beings have been of European descent.80 The original
mission of human rights movements was to save Europeans.81 Othered
peoples who were the recipients of Third World treatment were not
the subjects of human rights protections.82
D. Proposing Critical Race Third World Approaches to Education
Policy
Education policy is a prime field for TWAIL Scholarship because
TWAIL purports to (and for the most part does) combat systemic
70. Id. at 277.
71. Id. at 233–42.
72. Id. at 204, 233–42.
73. Mutua, supra note 22, at 233–36.
74. Id. at 237–39.
75. Id. at 204.
76. Id. at 204–05.
77. See Rajagopal, supra note 36, at 775.
78. See id. at 770.
79. Anghie & Chimni, supra note 17, at 84.
80. Mutua, supra note 22, at 210–11.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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oppression while legitimizing counterhegemonic narratives.83 How-
ever, there is no evidence that TWAIL scholars have taken seriously
education policy or the role of educational practices or processes in en-
trenching oppressive narratives of already marginalized peoples.
TWAIL scholarship also acknowledges that studies pertaining to op-
pression are inherently inter-, multi-, and transdisciplinary.84 TWAIL
scholarship, however, only passively considers the role of race and
racism in the marginalization of peoples subjected to Third World
treatment.85 On the other hand, CRT often fails to include the history
of the colonial project, which set the stage for much of the oppression
of Black peoples in the United States and elsewhere.86 Activists and
scholars at the center of human rights campaigns in the United States
and globally stand to learn much from investigating movements to-
wards human rights in a more transnational context.87 Many of the
traditions of TWAIL are aligned with the traditions of Critical Race
Theory.88 For instance, TWAIL’s insistence that history is told in a
global, rather than West-centric, context is akin to CRT’s efforts at
battling ahistoricism.89 Similarly, TWAIL’s efforts to center the lived
experiences of peoples subjected to Third World treatment is aligned
to the CRT tenet of counterstorytelling.90 TWAIL’s rejection of hege-
monic universal narratives matches CRT’s rejection of essentialism.91
TWAIL’s critique of campaigns for human rights that almost always
come with a set of neoliberal, oppressive policies resembles the CRT
tenets of critique of liberalism, the permanence of racism, and in-
terest convergence.92
The remainder of this Article is dedicated to discussing how cur-
rent struggles for liberation and human rights in the United States
may be analyzed under TWAEP-Crit. In doing so, I consider how the
United States’ rejection of human rights treaties rejects the needs
of Black peoples in the United States and distances Black Americans
83. Okafor, supra note 13, at 377.
84. Badaru, supra note 18, at 381.
85. Id. at 380–81.
86. See DIXSON & ROUSSEAU, supra note 6, at 33.
87. Sharon K. Hom & Eric K. Yamamoto, Collective Memory, History, and Social
Change, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1747, 1780 (2000); see also Mary Romero, Crossing the Immigra-
tion and Race Border: A Critical Race Theory Approach to Immigration Studies, 11
CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 23, 27 (2008).
88. See id.; supra Part II.
89. See DIXSON & ROUSSEAU, supra note 6, at 33; Chimni, supra note 16, at 502,
511–12.
90. See Chimni, supra note 16, at 500.
91. See DIXSON & ROUSSEAU, supra note 6, at 33; Okafor, supra note 13, at 377.
92. DIXSON & ROUSSEAU, supra note 6, at 33; Badaru, supra note 18, at 383 (sug-
gesting that international law that advocates for economic justice constantly violates
human rights).
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from power. I argue that the United States’ rejection of human rights
treaties serves to treat Black peoples in the United States as Third
World citizens. Following this analysis, I apply what I conceive to be
a set of practices that are inherent to TWAEP-Crit. In essence, I
answer the call of Sharon Hom & Eric Yamamoto in which they articu-
lated, “The relationship between international and domestic rights
discourse and its implications for legal and political social justice
strategies has also been undertheorized.”93
I acknowledge the difficulty in arguing that Black Americans
may, in fact, be most properly treated as having been assigned to re-
ceive Third World treatment. However, I make this claim to support
the need for a common response to a global attack on peoples subjected
to Third World treatment, even if such responses do not prompt
identical, uniform appearances of resistance.94 I make this argument
to suggest that artificial, arbitrary geographic boundaries only en-
courage fragmentation among peoples subjected to Third World
treatment. Fragmentation then leads to a lack of unity and overlooks
the fact that a future paradigm towards social justice may, in fact,
see a unified, yet diverse structure that allows for an effective defense
against the First World’s oppressive forces and agendas.95 I make
this claim with the knowledge that differences in local resistance
and coping with Third World treatment have troubled attempts at
a transnational coalition to battle Third World treatment.96 I, there-
fore, use this Article to argue that Black Americans should claim
Third World status. I argue this knowing that identification as Third
World, especially as a self-proclaimed title, is to choose to stand in
a struggle that reimagines the world, not simply reshuffles or redis-
tributes existing resources and power.97 I argue that Third World is
a function of a particular type of treatment from hegemonic power,
not as a function of location. I accept that peoples subjected to Third
World treatment have long had a voice to which the First World has
paid little, if any, attention.98 I suggest that Black Americans join this
chorus of voices, for we have much to learn from this ongoing struggle.
I reimagine the term “Third World” to serve as a unifying call to
resistance to the colonial project, a call that is comprised of numer-
ous individual and collective practices that undermine and replace
a system of systemic disadvantage. In other words, Third World, in
93. Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 87, at 1754.
94. See Chimni, supra note 16, at 503.
95. See id. at 508–09.
96. Rajagopal, supra note 36, at 767.
97. Mickelson, supra note 42, at 360.
98. See id.
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my usage, serves to globalize an understanding of the myriad ways
that peoples subjected to Third World treatment are othered and
how they resist on a daily basis.99
III. THE UNITED STATES’ REJECTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE MARGINALIZATION OF BLACK AMERICANS
Despite the United States’ role in fashioning international hu-
man rights law, the United States has been at best reticent to apply
such international laws and conventions in the context of domestic
civil and human rights.100 The United States has ratified very few
human rights treaties without attaching reservations that practi-
cally nullify the treaties.101 In general, the United States refuses,
rejects, or hollows any treaties that seek to stymie and/or overcome
racial oppression.102 In addition to rejecting and placing reservations
that in practice reject treaties, the United States has come close to
placing constitutional limitations on the ability of international civil
and human rights treaties to address consistent and persistent racial
issues in the United States.103 It is for these reasons that scholars
and advocates arguing for social justice should scrutinize the United
States’ perfunctory acceptance of and participate in international
civil and human rights treaties.104
A. Rejection of International Human Rights Treaties and Racial
Oppression in the United States
From its early beginnings the federal government of the United
States possessed the powers necessary to agree to and ratify interna-
tional treaties and agreements; moreover, these treaties, once ratified,
were self-executing.105 Thus, international treaties had the effect of
domestic legislations upon acceptance and implementation, giving
the federal government’s broad and expansive powers to address
domestic problems through treaty-making that would otherwise be
99. See Chimni, supra note 12, at 19–22.
100. See Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of Inter-
national Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, Table 1 (2008).
101. John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and
the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV 1955, 1973–76 (1999).
102. See id.
103. Robert Anderson IV, “Ascertained in a Different Way”: The Treaty Power at the
Crossroads of Contract, Compact, and Constitution, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 189, 236–37
(2001).
104. See id.
105. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867,
1876–80 (2005).
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unconstitutional.106 According to Section 2 of Article II of the Consti-
tution of the United States of America, the president has the power
to agree to international treaties subject to the approval of two-thirds
of the Senate.107 The preferred treatment of treaties is an apparent
breach of federalism, but the signers of the Constitution understood
this preferred treatment as a remedy to the potential obstacles of
federalism.108 John C. Yoo argues that international law and domestic
law operated in fairly isolated spheres at the signing of the Consti-
tution, but David Golove notes that the United States’ engagement
in international agreements and treaties has been and often still is
wise in both principle and interest.109 Notably, Yoo and Golove dis-
agree upon the extent of the Treaty Power’s authority; yet, neither
give proper treatment to a discussion of racial oppression and the
limitations and delimitations of the Treaty Power.110 It is, therefore,
reasonable to question the analyses of both scholars since race was
and still is one of the most salient issues in the United States. Not-
withstanding this objection and disagreeing about the wisdom of the
United States’ current practices in international law, both Yoo and
Golove accept that the Treaty Power can result in the creation of
domestic law and policy.111
Although the general consensus of international law experts
suggests that the Treaty Power can be used to reach domestic issues
in manners that would be deemed unconstitutional if undertaken by
the legislative branch, the United States has used this power in
limited contexts.112 The federal government of the United States has
sought to use this power in the areas of trade, commerce, and envi-
ronmental protection, but the federal government has opted out of
using the Treaty Power to remedy disparate racial outcomes in
human rights.113 John C. Yoo asserts that the Senate has only re-
jected a significant treaty that the president sought twice over the last
century; however, he fails to account for the number of significant
human rights treaties that the Senate has ratified with reserva-
tions, understandings, and declarations (which are tantamount to
106. David Golove, The New Confederalism: Treaty Delegations of Legislative, Executive,
and Judicial Authority, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1697, 1699–1700 (2003); Vasan Kesavan, The
Three Tiers of Federal Law, 100 NW. U.L. REV. 1479, 1481–82 (2006); Julian G. Ku, The
Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations: New Problems with Old So-
lutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71, 74 (2000); Rosenkranz, supra note 105, at 1869; Yoo, supra
note 101, at 1958–60.
107. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
108. Yoo, supra note 101, at 1969.
109. See Yoo, supra note 101, at 1967. But see Golove, supra note 106, at 1747.
110. See Golove, supra note 106, at 1971; Yoo, supra note 101, at 2092–94.
111. See Golove, supra note 106, at 1699–1700; Yoo, supra note 101, at 1958, 1961.
112. Yoo, supra note 101, at 1959–61.
113. Hathaway, supra note 100, at 1240–41, 1256.
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a refusal and rejection of the treaty).114 The rise of non-self-executing
reservations in the United States’ ratification of international civil
and human rights treaties has limited the ability of some would-be
litigants to enforce their rights against the United States in the fed-
eral court even when the United States does adopt and ratify inter-
national human rights treaties and agreements.115 Some scholars
argue that treaties are and should be enforceable in the courts of the
United States, but such theoretical banter does not resolve plaintiffs’
inability to pursue justice in courts of law.116
The Supreme Court of the United States sanctioned the expan-
sion of the Treaty Power in Missouri v. Holland.117 In Missouri, the
Court confirmed that the federal legislature automatically obtained
powers to implement legislation necessary to effectuate an approved
and ratified treaty.118 Moreover, most international law experts accept
that the legislation arising under the Treaty Power may exceed the
normal constraints of the Constitution.119 Somewhat surprisingly,
Nicholas Rosenkranz identified a number of instances in which the
federal legislature has promulgated and the Supreme Court has ap-
proved legislation that has served to limit human rights under the
Treaty Power, but he found no instances in which the expansion of
human rights has derived from the Treaty Power.120 He only fanta-
sizes and hypothesizes about examples of the expansion of human
rights through the Treaty Power.121 Still, Missouri provides substan-
tial cover for the federal government to pursue and achieve racial
justice in the United States.122 Yet, the record is devoid of such radical
approaches to securing racial justice.
The potential of the Treaty Power to address issues of racial in-
equity in the United States does not stop at the holding of Missouri.123
In fact, the federal government has long used congressional-executive
agreements to create treaty-like international agreements.124 The
United States has used the congressional-executive agreement process
114. John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties? The Constitutionality of Congressional Executive
Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757, 758 (2001).
115. See Hathaway, supra note 100, at 1318–20.
116. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals,
92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1083–84 (1992).
117. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432, 435 (1920).
118. Rosenkranz, supra note 105, at 1869.
119. Golove, supra note 106, at 1699–1700; Kesavan, supra note 106, at 1507;
Rosenkranz, supra note 105, at 1934; Yoo, supra note 101, at 1961–62.
120. See generally Rosenkranz, supra note 105.
121. Id. at 1897–1903.
122. Id. at 1899–1901.
123. Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79
TEX. L. REV. 961, 1005–06 (2001).
124. Id. at 963–64, 986–90; Yoo, supra note 101, at 758.
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to form de facto treaties in the areas of military, arms, and security,
as well as trade and commerce.125 Unfortunately, the federal govern-
ment has never sought to pursue human rights through this alter-
native pathway to international and domestic human rights, a sign
that the federal government is not interested in the pursuit of human
rights in the United States.126 The federal government argues that
the implementation of human rights treaties would regulate private
actions and would go beyond the boundaries of the Bill of Rights.127
The result of the United States’ failure and reasoning has been that
the United States continues to violate international customs regarding
human rights.128 In contexts outside of human rights, the Senate has
often given the president boundless power to make treaties.129 Perhaps
as equally confounding as the lack of human rights agreements
through the congressional-executive agreement is the fact that the
Supreme Court has considered international standards of decency
in some human rights cases.130 The Supreme Court’s willingness to
incorporate international perspectives into human rights cases has
not, however, encouraged the broader federal government to become
more aggressive in its pursuit of domestic civil and human rights.131
B. Refusal and Race: The United States’ International Policy and
Domestic Racism
While it is true that the Supreme Court once attempted to limit
and more recently appears to expand the influence of international
law on domestic law and policy, this expansion has not recently or in
the past been expanded to efforts to eradicate racism in the United
States.132 Moreover, Congress’ past actions suggest that the United
States commitment to racial equity and equality are without sub-
stance. In the 1950s, the United States Senate came within one vote
of ratifying a constitutional amendment—the Bricker Amendment—
that would have made any treaty that ran counter to the Constitution
invalid.133 Robert Anderson IV credits the failure of the Bricker
Amendment, which pursued a states’ rights agenda, to both the Su-
preme Court’s holdings that limited the Treaty Power to restraints
125. Spiro, supra note 123, at 996–1004.
126. See id.
127. Yoo, supra note 114, at 827–28.
128. See id.
129. Hathaway, supra note 100, at 1239–49, 1270–71.
130. Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. OF INT’L L. 1, 67,
71–72, 75, 77, 117 (2006).
131. See id. at 83.
132. See supra notes 105–31 and accompanying text.
133. Anderson, supra note 103, at 195; Hathaway, supra note 100, at 1303.
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found in the Bill of Rights and expanded the federal government’s
power through Commerce Clause cases, as well as the executive
branches’ public promise to exhibit self-restraint when agreeing to
treaties and other international agreements that concerned domes-
tic policies and politics.134 Oona Hathaway is not as forgiving in her
analysis of the Bricker Amendment.135 She asserts that Senator
Bricker, of Ohio, was a conservative and adds that he was seeking
to give states a right to regulate the president’s ability to create any
international agreements.136 Furthermore, Hathaway mentions that
Bricker was deeply concerned about how treaties pursuing civil and
human rights might impact segregation, which was legal at the
time.137 In addition to Senator Bricker’s language, Hathaway cites
similar language from Senator Dulles of Virginia and Time Magazine
to prove her point.138 Finally, she argues that then-President Eisen-
hower not only committed himself to self-restraint in regard to seeking
international human rights agreements that would impact domestic
laws, policies, and practices; but she asserts that Eisenhower appears
to have limited all future presidents’ human rights agendas.139 In
particular, Hathaway finds that the United States ratified all hu-
man rights treaties and “agreements with reservations, understand-
ings, and declarations that rendered them unenforceable.”140 Thus,
prominent international law scholars have considered the United
States’ efforts to stymie human rights treaties and—to different
extents—have noted the nation’s failure to expand human rights.141
The United States’ refusal to embrace international policies that
would ensure, rather than just assure, minoritized peoples’ civil and
human rights aligns with the nation’s domestic assaults on equity
and equality. The Supreme Court of the United States’ rulings have
served as a major impediment to civil and human rights of its citi-
zens.142 For example, in Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I & II),143 the
Court issued holdings that both prevented any efforts at meaningful
desegregation and politically sabotaged state legislatures that sought
to battle segregation independent of the federal effort.144 Not long
134. Anderson, supra note 103, at 195–96.
135. Hathaway, supra note 100, at 1302–06.
136. Id. at 1302–03.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1303.
139. Id. at 1303–04.
140. Id. at 1304.
141. Anderson, supra note 103, at 236–37; Hathaway, supra note 100, at 1276, 1302;
Yoo, supra note 101, at 1974–75.
142. See infra notes 143–54 and accompanying text.
143. 433 U.S. 267, 281–82 (1977); 418 U.S. 717, 744–45 (1974).
144. Steven L. Nelson & Alison C. Tyler, Examining Pennsylvania Human Relations
Commission v. School District of Philadelphia: Considering How the Supreme Court’s
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after the Court’s disastrous rulings in Milliken, the Court issued a
ruling in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.145 The Bakke
decision severely limited affirmative action programs by limiting the
use of quotas as well as other affirmative action plans in post-sec-
ondary admission.146 In addition to forbidding public higher educa-
tion institutions from using racial quotas for admission, Bakke had
the impact of expanding the definition of diversity to include a
number of categories that benefited white Americans and allowing
white Americans to counter holistic admissions processes with ad-
missions processes that heavily favored purportedly more objective
standardized tests.147 The Bakke ruling had and still has implica-
tions for racial equity and equality for primary, secondary, and post-
secondary education as the arguments in Bakke have been used to
limit even voluntary uses of race that might be only facially similar
to quotas.148 The United States’ attack on domestic policies aimed at
racial equity and equality ultimately has recently reached the right
to the electoral franchise.149 In Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme
Court gutted the Voting Rights Act of 1965.150 In doing so, the Court
removed Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, perhaps the United
States’ most potent and most effective civil rights legislation in mod-
ern times.151 Because nearly all school boards in the United States
are elected from relatively small districts, minoritized peoples are
often overrepresented on elected school boards; and school boards
are generally the first elected offices for racialized minorities in the
United States.152 The Voting Rights Act is, therefore, important to
educational equity and justice. In particular, research suggests that
popularly elected and politically accountable school boards with
equitable representation may result in better academic outcomes
and more equitable disciplinary outcomes for Black students than do
school boards with less political accountability and less equitable rep-
resentation.153 Moreover, minoritized peoples may find themselves
Waning Support of School Desegregation Affected Desegregation Efforts Based on State
Law, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1051, 1051, 1055 (2017).
145. 438 U.S. 265, 307–09 (1978).
146. Id. at 307–09, 320.
147. Steven L. Nelson, Different Script, Same Caste in the Use of Passive and Active
Racism: A Critical Race Theory Analysis of the (Ab)use of “House Rules” in Race-Related
Education Cases, 22 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 297, 313, 314 (2016).
148. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 722,
747–48 (2007).
149. See Shelby Cty v. Holder, 570 U.S. 2, 24 (2013).
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. See FREDERICK HESS, SCHOOL BOARDS AT THE DAWN OF THE 21ST CENTURY:
CONDITIONS AND CHALLENGES OF DISTRICT GOVERNANCE 25 (2002).
153. See Steven L. Nelson, Killing Two Achievements with One Stone: The Intersec-
tional Impact of Shelby County on the Rights to Vote and Access High Performing Schools,
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with little legal recourse for abusive and discriminatory actions when
their elected leaders are unceremoniously removed from power.154
Indeed, the United States’ domestic policy is on par with its rejec-
tion of international policies that mandate more than the nebulous
equitable opportunity in advocating for equitable outcomes.
C. Intersection of the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and Racially Inequitable
Educational Outcomes
In 1966 and nearing the pinnacle of federal lawsuits banning le-
galized segregation, the United States adopted the International Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.155
The United States did not, however, fully adopt and implement the
Convention, choosing instead to attach a number of understandings
and reservations to the nation’s agreement to join other nations in
their pursuit of eliminating all forms of racial discrimination.156
Instead, the United States adopted only those portions of the Conven-
tion that would not conflict with existing constitutional law.157 The
United States’ failure to fully adopt the treaty in favor of constitutional
law maintained the country’s pattern of subjecting human rights
12 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 225, 265–66 (2016) (finding that charter schools in
Florida, which are governed by local school boards, have more accountability and higher
academic performance than charter schools in Louisiana, which are governed by private
boards that are not always accountable to local school boards); Steven L. Nelson & Jennifer
E. Grace, The Right to Remain Silent in New Orleans: The Role of Non-Politically Account-
able School Boards in the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 40 NOVA L. REV. 447, 483–84 (2016)
(finding that schools that remained under the governance of the popularly elected Orleans
Parish School Board outperformed schools that were subjected to state takeover); see
also Steven L. Nelson, Racial Subjugation By Another Name: Using the Links in the
School-to-Prison Pipeline to Reassess State Takeover District Performance, 9 GEO. J.L.
& MOD. CRIT. RACE PERSP. 1, 2, 19 (2017) [hereinafter Nelson, Racial Subjugation By
Another Name] (finding that there were no instances where the state takeover of public
schools, which halts democratic school board elections, resulted in fewer disparate and
harsh disciplinary outcomes).
154. Steven L. Nelson & Heather N. Bennett, Are Black Parents Locked Out of Challeng-
ing Disproportionately Low Charter School Board Representation? Assessing the Role of the
Federal Courts in Building a House of Cards, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 153,
195–96 (2016) (arguing that neither the Voting Rights Act nor the Equal Protection Clause
can protect Black parents, who are most likely to live in areas where charter schools
have proliferated, from having their ability to control the governance of public schools
taken away).
155. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
156. Robin H. Gise, Rethinking McCleskey v. Kemp: How U.S. Ratification of the Inter-
national Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination Provides
a Remedy for Claims of Racial Disparity in Death Penalty Cases, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
2270, 2295–96 (1999).
157. Id. at 2295.
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treaties and agreements to increased scrutiny and severe limitations
while providing other treaties with powers to shift federal-state
balances of power.158 The consequence of the United States’ effective
rejection of the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination is that the country continues to
produce racially disparate human rights outcomes that are upheld
and promoted by the United States’ refusal to agree to and pursue
equitable human rights outcomes at all costs. Essentially, the United
States federal government has and continues to uphold, protect, and
promote white supremacy through its actions against accepting and
implementing international human rights treaties.
D. Part I, Article 1 of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the
United States
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination sets forth an international agenda to eradicate
both racist intentions and racist outcomes.159 Although the Conven-
tion applies to all forms of racial discrimination, racial discrimination
in the provision, access to, and outcomes from education are high-
lighted in the adopted version of the Convention.160 The preamble of
the Convention sets forth an aggressive agenda to speedily elimi-
nate the vestiges of racial discrimination.161 For instance, the pre-
amble calls for the elimination of “racial discrimination throughout
the world in all its forms and manifestations and of securing under-
standing of and respect for the dignity of the human person.”162 The
preamble continues, “any doctrine of superiority based on racial dif-
ferentiation is scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust
and dangerous, and that there is no justification for racial discrimi-
nation, in theory or in practice, anywhere.”163 Two things are abun-
dantly clear from the language of the preamble. The first is that the
purpose of the Convention is to eliminate all manifestations of racial
discrimination.164 Manifestations are the observable outcomes of
abstract ideas. Thus, the Convention seeks to eliminate disparate
racial outcomes. Second, the Convention does not accept arguments
that disparate racial outcomes are the consequence of racialized
158. Id. at 2318–19.
159. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
supra note 155, art. 5.





324 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.              [Vol. 26:303
minorities’ biological corruptness.165 The United States, as a signa-
tory to the Convention, has at first glance committed itself to the
noble and global agenda of addressing all forms of racism, but upon
further consideration, the United States’ list of objections, reserva-
tions, and understandings practically restricts the nation’s ability
to even begin to address the Convention’s charge.
Part I, Article 1 of the Convention defines racial discrimination.166
The Convention’s definition of racial discrimination is broad in that
it includes policies, both formal and informal, that have the “purpose
of effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or ex-
ercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms
in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public
life.”167 The architects of the Convention carefully constructed Article
1 to exclude from the definition of racial discrimination acts that are
designed to protect racialized minorities against racial discrimination
so long as those measures do not create separate rights for separate
racial and/or ethnic groups and are not continued after the protective
acts have accomplished their objectives.168 On its face, the Conven-
tion supports affirmative action policies, which the Supreme Court
is both determined and destined to outlaw in the United States.169
Given that affirmative action policies, including quotas, may serve to
protect racialized minorities from exclusion in higher education, the
Supreme Court, if it honors the supremacy of the Convention, would
be in support of affirmative action policies until student demographics
are at least closer to racial parity. The Committee on the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination (CERD) supports this stance as it chastised
the United States’ critique of affirmative action policies in a formal
letter.170 In the same letter, CERD called into question the United
States’ limitations on the use of disparate impact analyses.171 CERD,
on several occasions, took issues with the disproportionate impact
that policies had on racialized minorities.172
The United States, according to CERD, fails to even identify the
forms of racial discrimination that the Convention contemplates.173
165. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
supra note 155, pmbl.
166. Id. art. 1(1).
167. Id. art. 1(1).
168. Id. art. 1(4).
169. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307–09 (1978).
170. See U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Considerations
of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of the Convention: Concluding
Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: United States
of America, ¶ 15, CERD/C/USA/CO16 (May 8, 2008).
171. Id. ¶ 35.
172. See id. ¶¶ 16, 20–22, 27–28.
173. Id. ¶¶ 10–11.
2020] TOWARDS A TRANSNATIONAL CRITICAL RACE THEORY 325
The United States restricts the employment of disparate impact anal-
yses to identify civil and human rights complaints.174 As a result, the
United States federal government develops, implements, and promul-
gates legislation that creates and maintains racially discriminatory
outcomes.175 The United States’ focus on issues like the achievement
gap has produced a bevy of legislation purportedly aiming to produce
more and better outcomes for marginalized, disenfranchised, and op-
pressed people.176 Unfortunately, these efforts have only aided and
abetted efforts at racism and racial discrimination.177 For instance,
current legislation aimed at improving test scores purports to address
the achievement gap, but education policy that seeks only the im-
provement of standardized test scores has served to further oppress,
marginalize, and disenfranchise Black students, parents, and com-
munities in the United States.178 These policies are problematic in
the first instance because any effort to improve educational outcomes
must consider the multiplicity of oppressions that Black students,
parents, and communities face and have faced since our arrival in
the United States.179 Likewise, education policy that will successfully
pursue educational justice, equity, and equality must consider the
opportunity gap.180 It is not enough to center the failures of the edu-
cational systems on Black students, parents, and communities by
alleging that a broader commitment to educational excellence, assimi-
lation, or other forms of behaviors normed to whiteness will eradicate
racism or racially disparate outcomes for Black students. Thus, the
implementation of education policies that fail to consider the policies’
direct and indirect impacts on the Black community are destined to
fail and to replicate and maintain racially discriminatory outcomes.
The United States’ efforts to improve educational outcomes, as
measured chiefly by state test scores, have done little to improve the
academic outcomes for minoritized students.181 The school reform
174. Id. ¶ 35.
175. See id. ¶ 34 (critiquing No Child Left Behind, the then-existent iteration of the Ele-
mentary and Secondary Schools Act, as having maintained and created racial disparities).
176. See Celia Rousseau Anderson & Adrienne D. Dixson, Down By the Riverside: A
CRT Perspective on Education Reform in Two River Cities, 51 URB. EDUC. 363, 383–84
(2016) (using Critical Race Theory to articulate how the racial politics of education reform
that purported to address poor academic outcomes in New Orleans and Memphis ulti-
mately served to set a new politics of education. These new politics of education resulted
in the marginalized of Black stakeholders).
177. Id. at 384.
178. Tina M. Trujillo, The Disproportionate Erosion of Local Control: Urban School
Boards, High-Stakes Accountability, and Democracy, 27 EDUC. POL’Y 334, 346, 353 (2013).
179. Gloria Ladson-Billings, From the Achievement Gap to the Education Debt: Under-
standing Achievement in U.S. Schools, 35 EDUC. RESERCHER. 3, 4–5 (2006).
180. H. Richard Milner IV, Rethinking Achievement Gap Talk in Urban Education, 48
URB. EDUC. 3, 4–5 (2013).
181. See Nelson & Grace, supra note 153, at 487–88.
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movement, which encompasses a variety of education policies that
endeavor to eliminate racially disparate educational outcomes, has
fully embraced a series of private-public partnerships that jeopardize
the civil and human rights of students of color while providing access
to schooling facilities and programs that are uncertain at best.182 For
instance, the ever-expanding charter school and school choice move-
ments have been found to aid in racial segregation,183 jeopardize stu-
dents’ civil rights,184 deprive minoritized communities of the electoral
franchise and political voice,185 and contribute to disparate disciplin-
ary outcomes.186 Education reform policies in the United States are,
therefore, violative of Article II of the Convention.
E. Part I, Article 5 of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the
United States
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination seeks to eliminate intentional and uninten-
tional discrimination in all aspects of human life.187 Part I, Article 5
commands that nations joining the Convention abolish racial dis-
crimination by protecting a wide range of legal, political, cultural,
economic, and social rights.188 Article 5’s substantial coverage of
human rights suggests that the architects of the Convention recog-
nized the interrelatedness of oppression. For instance, Article 5 re-
quires the countries party to the Convention establish equal access
to judicial tribunals, protect the safety and security of peoples of color,
protect the political, civil, economic, social, and cultural rights, and
regulate discrimination in public accommodations.189 The United
States has failed to meet the mandates of Part I, Article 5 even when
182. See, e.g., infra notes 183–86 and accompanying text.
183. Chase M. Billingham & Matthew O. Hunt, School Racial Composition and
Parental Choice: New Evidence on the Preferences of White Parents in the United States,
89 SOC. EDUC. 99, 101 (2016); Erica Frankenberg, Genevieve Siegel-Hawley & Jia Wang,
Choice Without Equity: Charter School Segregation, 19 EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES
1, 3 (2011).
184. Erica Frankenberg, Preston C. Green III & Steven L. Nelson, Fighting “Demo-
graphic Destiny”: A Legal Analysis of Attempts of the Strategies White Enclaves Might
Use to Maintain School Segregation, 24 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 39, 59–60 (2013); Janelle
T. Scott, Rosa Parks Moment? School Choice and the Marketization of Civil Rights, 54
CRITICAL STUD. EDUC. 5, 13–15 (2013).
185. Nelson & Bennett, supra note 154, at 199–200.
186. DANIEL J. LOSEN, MICHAEL A. KEITH II, CHERI L. HODSON & TIA E. MARTINEZ, CHAR-
TER SCHOOLS, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND SCHOOL DISCIPLINE: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW 11 (2016).
187. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
supra note 155, pmbl.
188. Id. art. 5.
189. Id.
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it purports to act in the pursuit of civil and human rights for Black
students, parents, and communities. The manner in which the United
States has failed to meet the mandates of Part I, Article 5 are best
evidenced by the nation’s steadfast commitment to contemporary
education reform policies that have contributed to the regression of
previously earned civil and human rights and have created new or
exacerbated existing barriers to civil and human rights.190
Part I, Article 5(c) of the Convention requires that nations that
are party to the Convention protect the political participation of
racialized minorities.191 Specifically, the Article 5(c) requires that
minoritized populations have access to universal and equal suffrage.192
State takeovers of public schools and school districts disproportion-
ately impact Black and Brown schools and school districts, replacing
locally elected and predominately minority school boards with ap-
pointed predominately white policymakers.193 Minoritized populations
are targeted for state censuring and takeover even when their actual
performance does not significantly diverge from the achievement of
neighboring predominately white school districts.194 Not surpris-
ingly, predominately minority school boards report feeling targeted
for school and school district takeover.195 State takeovers of public
schools result in the displacement, replacement, and shunting of
political powers of minoritized populations in the United States.196
Moreover, constituents of school districts under the governance of
locally elected school boards comprised of racialized minorities find
little relief in the United States’ judicial system after these constitu-
ents lose their political power.197
Part I, Article 5(e)(v) of the Convention requires nations that are
party of the Convention prevent discriminatory access to the right to
education and training.198 State takeover districts typically exacerbate
190. See Nelson, supra note 153, at 226, 268; see also Nelson & Bennett, supra note
154, at 156, 199–200 (arguing that education reform practices have contributed to the
electoral disenfranchisement of Black peoples).
191. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
supra note 155, art. 5(c).
192. Id.
193. Steven L. Nelson, Balancing School Choice and Political Voice: An Analysis of the
Legality of Public Charter Schools in New Orleans, Louisiana Under Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act 8–9 (Dec. 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State
Univ.) (on file with Pennsylvania State University).
194. Steven L. Nelson, Could the State Takeover of Public Schools Create a State-
Created Danger? Theorizing at the Intersection of State Takeover Districts, the School-to-
Prison Pipeline, and Racial Oppression, 27 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 1, 20 (2018).
195. See id. at 25–26.
196. Id.
197. See Nelson & Bennett, supra note 154, at 176.
198. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
supra note 155, art. 5(e)(v).
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the school-to-prison pipeline for Black students.199 In the context of
cities that are disproportionately Black and subjected to state takeover
policies, the state takeover of public schools has failed to disrupt the
school-to-prison pipeline and in many cases has resulted in greater
proportions of Black students entering the school-to-prison pipe-
line.200 This finding is not, however, surprising. A long line of litera-
ture supports the notion that better descriptive representation
(racial representation) on school boards results in better substantive
representation (the ability to develop, adopt, and implement policies
that benefit Black students, parents, and communities).201 Since state
takeover districts are linked to the displacement and replacement
of Black education policymakers in favor of white policymakers who
are not directly accountable to Black voters,202 research indicates
that Black students enrolled in state takeover schools and school
districts are likely to experience less than excellent academic achieve-
ment.203 Further research suggests that the state takeover of public
schools and school districts has not resulted in greater academic
achievement for Black students enrolled in schools or school dis-
tricts subjected to state takeover.204 Recent studies that find that
locally accountable school and school district remediation efforts
provide further support for arguments that the state takeover of
public schools and school districts are relatively ineffective interven-
tion measures.205 Students who are behind academically are more
199. Nelson, supra note 194, at 31–32; Steven L. Nelson, Monica Lynn Ridgeway,
Timberly L. Baker, Cassandra D. Green & Tiffany Campbell, Continued Disparate Disci-
pline: Theorizing State Takeover Districts’ Impact on the Continued Oppression of Black
Girls, URB. EDUC. (forthcoming 2020) [hereinafter Nelson, Continued Disparate Discipline];
Nelson, Racial Subjugation By Another Name, supra note 153, at 6–7.
200. Nelson, supra note 194, at 34; Nelson, Continued Disparate Discipline, supra note
199, at 22.
201. See MICHAEL B. BERKMAN & ERIC PLUTZER, TEN THOUSAND DEMOCRACIES: POLI-
TICS AND PUBLIC OPINION IN AMERICA’S SCHOOL DISTRICTS 149 (2009); Kenneth J. Meier
et al., Structural Choices and Representational Biases: The Post-Election Color of Represen-
tation, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 758, 766–67 (2005); Kenneth J. Meier & Robert E. England, Black
Representation and Education Policy: Are They Related? 78 AM. J. POL. SCI. 392, 400–01
(1984); Ted P. Robinson et al., Black Resources and Black School Board Representation:
Does Political Structure Matter? 66 SOC. SCI. Q. 976, 981 (1985); Joseph Stewart, Jr. et
al., Black Representation in Urban School Districts: From School Board to Office to
Classroom, 42 W. Pol. Q. 287, 300–02 (1989).
202. Nelson, supra note 193, at 8–9.
203. See supra note 201 and accompanying text (discussing a sample of available re-
search that suggests that descriptive representation is a statistically significant factor
for obtaining substantive representation).
204. See Nelson & Grace, supra note 153, at 487–88 (noting that charter schools are
considered a success when analyzing standardized test scores, but those test scores are
not indicative of Black students success); Kenneth K. Wong & Francis X. Shen, Measuring
the Effectiveness of City and State Takeover as School Reform Strategy, 78 PEABODY J.
EDUC. 89, 117–18 (2003).
205. RON ZIMMER ET AL., EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTS OF TENNESSEE’S ACHIEVEMENT
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likely to receive excessive discipline.206 Thus, research suggesting
that state takeover districts exacerbate student discipline should be
expected.207 Likewise, if students are consistently and persistently
removed from the learning environment, it is likely that the United
States is violating Part I, Article 5(e)(v), which prohibits intentional
and unintentional discriminatory access to education and training.
F. Part I, Articles 2, 4, and 7 of the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the
United States
Part I, Articles 2 and 7 function in collaboration to require nations
party to the Convention to immediately adopt and enact policies that
expunge racism from public and private life.208 The United States
has failed to act on the edicts of Articles 2 and 7. To the contrary, the
United States federal government has redoubled its efforts to imple-
ment policies with discriminatory impacts on Black peoples.209 For
instance, the United States’ insistence on pursuing education reform
policies that limit or remove Black peoples’ access to the electoral
franchise, that place students in jeopardy of excessive disciplinary
actions—inclusive of suspensions, expulsions, referrals to law en-
forcement, and even arrest—for minor offenses, and that ensure that
White Americans are placed in authority over Black people is prob-
lematic and offends Articles 2 and 7.210 This is especially the case
since the United States is not simply moving slowly or on the other
hand, stalling the implementation of policies aimed at expelling
racism. The United States is, in fact, implementing and sustaining
policies that have the effect of racial discrimination.
Comparably, Part I, Article 4 compels nations that participate
in the Convention to prohibit organizations that promote and incite
racial discrimination.211 The United States’ infatuation with contem-
porary education reform policies also violates Article 4; the
SCHOOL DISTRICT ON STUDENT TEST SCORES 9–10 (2015); Julian Vasquez Heilig, Amy
Williams, Linda McSpadden McNeill & Christopher Lee, Is Choice a Panacea? An
Analysis of Black Secondary Student Attrition From KIPP, Other Private Charters and
Urban Districts, 2 BERKLEY REV. EDUC. 153, 156–57 (2011); see Nelson & Grace, supra
note 153, at 487–88.
206. See Emily Arcia, Achievement and Enrollment Status of Suspended Students: Out-
comes in a Larger, Multicultural School District, 38 EDUC. & URB. SOC’Y 359, 367 (2006).
207. See Nelson, supra note 194, at 31–32.
208. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
supra note 155, arts. 2, 7.
209. See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
210. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 153, at 232–33; Nelson, supra note 194, at 21–31.
211. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
supra note 155, art. 4.
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charterization of schools formally directly run by predominately
Black school boards displaces Black political power with dispropor-
tionately White political power.212 In doing this, the United States has
embraced a policy that enables charter management organizations
and educational management organizations to unceremoniously re-
move Black leaders from power and displace those pillars of the
community with White leaders.213 More clearly, the United States is
displacing elected, predominately Black governing bodies with pri-
vate organizations with White leadership that often shuns Black
leaders.214 As such, the United States violates Part I, Article 4, which
requires nations participating in the Convention to restrict and expel
organizations that have racist outcomes.215
IV. CONSIDERING CRITICAL RACE PERSPECTIVES ON THE
UNITED STATES’ FAILURE TO FULLY ADOPT
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
White Americans have failed to acknowledge how education
policies in the United States and the rejection of human rights treaties
serve to subject Black Americans to Third World treatment. As men-
tioned earlier, the existence and perpetuation of the school-to-prison
pipeline has roots in the United States’ deeply problematic racial
past.216 It is possible to use a variety of critical race frameworks to
analyze the school-to-prison pipeline. Cheryl I. Harris’ critique of
whiteness as a protected property interest applies to the United
States’ rejection of the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.217 Specifically, the nation’s
acceptance of the Convention with stipulations that frustrate the
Convention’s purposes serves only to maintain the legally protected
interest of whiteness.218 This is done to assure pursuits of equity
through the provision of vague opportunities while rejecting the use
of explicit requirements for equitable outcomes, which allows White
Americans to satisfy international calls for the elimination of all mani-
festations of racial discrimination while simultaneously assuring
that Black Americans do not make measurable damages to white
supremacist structures, a nod to Derrick Bell’s Interest Convergence
212. Nelson, supra note 153, at 232–33.
213. Id.; see Nelson & Bennett, supra note 154, at 199–200.
214. See Nelson, Continued Disparate Discipline, supra note 199, at 56–57.
215. See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, supra note 155, art. 4(b).
216. See Nelson, Continued Disparate Discipline, supra note 199, at 10–11.
217. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1714, 1724 (1993).
218. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
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Theory.219 Indistinguishably, the same white supremacist power struc-
tures seek to use color-blind strategies to remedy color-conscious
attacks on Black Americans. Color-blind strategies maintain white
supremacist structures by disallowing Black Americans to eliminate
barriers to equity and to close gaps in access and outcomes that exist
only due to the United States’ concerted efforts to subjugate Black
Americans.220 Furthermore, color-blind strategies, which focus on not
harming White Americans, create civil rights campaigns that focus
on protecting the perpetrators and beneficiaries of racial discrimina-
tion instead of those impacted by racial discrimination.221 Thus, the
United States has a clear and present reason for rejecting the will
of the global majority; in rejecting the will of the global majority, the
United States—in practice—reinforces racist policies that aim to
maintain, retain, and sustain white supremacy.
The domestic harms that Black Americans endure in the United
States are similar to the very Third World treatments that othered
peoples in international contexts suffer. When the United States
rejects an international human rights treaty, the country dooms
Black Americans to continued racial oppression by preventing them
from forming global coalitions that could hold the United States
accountable for addressing racial oppression. By accepting human
rights treaties with severe reservations, the United States often
commits to addressing some forms of racial discrimination but al-
lowing other forms to develop, remain, or proliferate. The United
States’ preference for piecemeal civil and human rights campaigns
allows the nation to overlook the mutable and amorphous nature of
racial oppression.222 Ultimately, the United States is able to claim
that it has eradicated racism in one area and plans to later address
racism in others. Most ironically, the United States is able to serve
two masters—under this approach: the nation both appeases inter-
national appeals for human rights and preserves racial subjugation
of Black Americans.223 This is the case for school desegregation.
Supreme Court edicts requiring the affirmative desegregation of
public schools begot legislation aimed at placing Black students in
219. See Bell, Interest Convergence Dilemma, supra note 3, at 523 (suggesting that Black
peoples only benefit so long as and to the extent that white people also benefit from policy).
220. EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS 47–49 (3d ed. 2010); see Neil
Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1991) (ar-
guing a color-blind constitution promotes white racial domination).
221. Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimina-
tion Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1052–54,
1067 (1978).
222. See id. at 1079–82 (discussing the contradictions in the United States’ antidis-
crimination law).
223. See Bell, supra note 3, at 472.
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special education and denying Black students and other students who
are marginalized access to public education by way of the school-to-
prison pipeline.224 Similarly, education reform policies in the United
States purport to pursue racial equity, but, in fact, rollback voting
rights for Black people.225 These outcomes are not unexpected.
Michael J. Dumas warns that schools are a site of Black suffering.226
Dumas’ argument is disconcerting because schools are practically the
only social institution in which all citizens in the United States are
required to engage. Thus, for those with white supremacist agendas
seeking to do harm to Black Americans, schools are the place in which
all Black people will at some point be present—and the place where
Black children, perhaps the most vulnerable subpopulation of Black
Americans, are sure to be found.
V. APPLYING CRITICAL RACE THIRD WORLD APPROACHES TO
EDUCATION POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
Critical Race Theory is a series of frameworks that help under-
stand the ways in which race and social constructs interact.227 There
are a wide range of loosely connected and defined tenets that com-
prise Critical Race Theory, but none specifically address the trans-
national impact of the processes that serve to subjugate Black
Americans.228 At the domestic level, white enclaves—areas of con-
centrated white populations in an increasingly diverse national
population—have used various legal, political, and economic tactics
to maintain political power.229 This Article revealed that the United
States and other Western powers are using similar tactics in global
law, policy, and political arenas. In the previous section, I provided
224. Alfredo J. Artiles & Stanley C. Trent, Overrepresentation of Minority Students in
Special Education: A Continuing Debate, 27 J. SPECIAL EDUC. 410, 419–20 (1994); Beth
A. Ferri & David J. Connor, In the Shadow of Brown: Special Education and Overrepresen-
tation of Students of Color, 26 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC. 92–93 (2005); Beth A. Ferri &
David J. Connor, Tools of Exclusion: Race, Disability, and (Re)segregated Education, 107
TCHR. C. REC. 453, 453–54 (2005); Christopher A. Mallett, The School-to-Prison Pipeline:
Disproportionate Impact on Vulnerable Children and Adolescents, 49 EDUC. & URB. SOC’Y
563, 571, 578 (2017); Russell J. Skiba et al., Achieving Equity in Special Education: History,
Status, and Current Challenges, 74 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 264, 281–82 (2008); Torin D.
Togut, The Gestalt of the School-to-Prison Pipeline: The Duality of Overrepresentation of
Minorities in Special Education and Racial Disparity in School Discipline on Minorities,
20 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 163, 179–80 (2011).
225. Scott, supra note 184, at 5; Nelson, supra note 153, at 232–33.
226. Michael J. Dumas, ‘Losing an Arm’: Schooling as a Site of Black Suffering, 17
RACE, ETHNICITY, & EDUC. 1, 2(2014).
227. Nelson, Continued Disparate Discipline, supra note 199, at 18.
228. Id.
229. See Frankenberg, Green & Nelson, supra note 184, at 39–40, 60.
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various critical race frameworks that might be useful to an analysis
of the United States’ global (in)action on human rights treaties. None
of those frameworks—alone—fully account for the United States’ ac-
tions that serve to prevent and disrupt global efforts at coalition
building. Critical Race Theory’s focus on abstract liberalism could
possibly fill this void. Abstract liberalism argues that liberalism, while
arguing for theoretical equity, fails to find instances in which poli-
cies and practices aimed at equity are appropriate.230 Still, abstract
liberalism doesn’t account for the United States’ chief assumption
that it has a less vicious racial past than other nations. Despite a
lengthy discussion of TWAIL in this Article, it is clear that TWAIL
does not alone address the unique colonial project of the United States.
This is especially the case since the United States is simply an exten-
sion of the European era of racialized subjugation for peoples sub-
jected to Third World treatment.231 It is for this reason that I argue for
the use of Critical Race Third World Approaches to Education Policy.
As previously stated, I view TWAEP-Crit as a scholarly approach.
Thus, TWAEP-Crit is part methodology and part theory. In the con-
text of methodology, I assert that TWAEP-Crit: 1) questions the
legitimacy of western research methodologies, 2) explores the de-
sires of peoples subjected to Third World treatment to develop new
research methodologies that are not necessarily derived from west-
ern thought, 3) reframes concepts of space and place to avoid restric-
tions that are essential to the continued racialized oppression of
peoples subjected to Third World treatment, 4) avoids the objectivity
trap in which scholars attempt to avoid any ideological footprint,
and 5) centers the experiences of those who are most removed from
the effects of the colonial, assimilationist agenda of the First World
(i.e., those in educational deserts and those who dropped out of school).
In the role of theory, I assert that TWAEP-Crit is first rejectionist in
its stance to contemporary law and order regimes. Secondly,
TWAEP-Crit explores, values, and centers the many ways in which
peoples subjected to Third World treatment have established cul-
tural norms and practices in education that predated the colonial
project. Thirdly, TWAEP-Crit embraces the common tenets of CRT
and TWAIL in the area of the permanence of oppression, the critique
of liberalism, the importance of counternarratives, the existence of
interest convergence, and the importance of history in shaping our
current context. Fourthly, TWAEP-Crit considers how individual
domestic policies and laws serve to disrupt global movements towards
a more unified, powerful Third World. Finally, TWAEP-Crit adopts
230. BONILLA-SILVA, supra note 220, at 28.
231. Mutua, supra note 22, at 213–14.
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the evaluative spirit of TWAIL: that the only legitimate evaluation
of education policy is through the eyes of those subjected to Third
World treatment.
IN THE STEAD OF A CONCLUSION: A CALL TO RESEARCH
As I conclude this Article, I would like to restate my hope for a
Transnational Critical Race Theory. This Article sought to bridge the
international-domestic divide that isolated uses of TWAIL and CRT
create. Indeed, I argued and provided evidence that Black Ameri-
cans are, in many ways, the recipients of Third World treatment. In
that way, neither TWAIL nor CRT are effective at addressing the
transnational issues that are produced by the continued colonial
project that promotes Eurocentrism. Indeed, I argued that merging
the themes of CRT and TWAIL to create TWAEP-Crit may best
address the need for a more globalized approach to evaluating edu-
cation policy and its impact on peoples subjected to Third World
treatment. I suspect that TWAEP-Crit may serve to unveil and de-
velop new conceptualizations of the desires and resistance strategies
of people who are marginalized at the hands of First World nations’
efforts to create more Third World nations, more peoples who are to
be subjected to Third World treatment, and Third World enclaves
within First World nations. To this end, I call upon researchers in
education policy, especially those who interrogate the role of race
and racism in the subjugation of peoples subjected to Third World
treatment, to conduct various forms of research to bring to light the
desires of those whose voices have been systemically ignored.
